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in Metaethics
Matthew Chrisman
IntroductIon
Metaethicists are interested in questions in the philosophy of language as these apply 
to ethical and more generally normative terms. One of the core questions in the phi-
losophy of language is how to explain the meaning of terms and the sentences in which 
they figure. Hence, an important question in metaethics is how to explain the meaning 
of ethical terms and the sentences in which they figure. In the philosophy of language, 
one of the main accounts of meaning stresses the roles terms play in an interconnected 
web of meanings central to our linguistic practice of talking about the world and what to 
do in it. This general view of meaning is sometimes dubbed “conceptual role semantics.” 
The basic idea is that the meaning of a term is not something it has, independent of con-
ceptual connections to other words and sentences, but rather something determined by 
these very connections.
The label “conceptual role semantics” misleadingly suggests that the view is a com-
petitor to standard approaches to model theoretic semantics (such as possible worlds 
semantics) as an attempt to model the way the meaning of whole sentences in particular 
languages could be a systematic function of the meaning of their parts and their logical 
forms. Although the issue is somewhat controversial, as I see things, the conceptual role 
view is best pursued instead as a metasemantic view (which is part of an overall theory 
of meaning attempting to explain the sources or foundations of meaningfulness in gen-
eral). Rather than proffering explanations of how terms of a particular language compose 
into meaningful sentences in a way that explains the productivity and learnability of a 
language, the conceptual role view offers an explanation of that in virtue of which words 
have the semantic values that they do. If this is right, the conceptual role view is more 
usefully contrasted (in its appeal to “conceptual roles”) with representationalist views 
about why terms have the meanings they do. Representationalist views stress, in contrast, 
the way pieces of language stand for things in the (mostly) extralinguistic environment. 
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As an intuitive and rough example, a representationalist and conceptual role theorist 
might agree that the semantic value of the predicate ‘is red’ is usefully thought of as 
something like the set of all red things. However, the representationalist will say that 
this predicate has that semantic value in virtue of standing for the property of redness, 
whereas a conceptual role theorist would say instead that this predicate has that semantic 
value in virtue of the conceptual connections to other predicates, such as ‘is colored’, ‘is 
crimson’, ‘is orange, is yellow, is blue…’. Hence, in what follows, I refer to “conceptual 
role accounts of meaning” and “conceptual role views” rather than the more customary 
“conceptual role semantics.”
Surprisingly, in spite of its being arguably one of the main theoretical traditions in 
contemporary philosophy of language, conceptual role views are somewhat difficult to 
locate in standard metaethical discussions of the meaning of ethical terms. Here, the 
debate is often conceived as one between cognitivists and noncognitivists, where (in this 
context) cognitivism is something like the thesis that ethical terms contribute represen-
tational content to the sentences in which they figure and hence function semantically 
primarily to determine conditions of reality that would make those sentences true; and 
noncognitivism is the view that ethical terms contribute emotive or evaluative content to 
the sentences in which they figure and so either don’t contribute to the sentences’ truth 
conditions or do so only in some trivial and metaphysically noncommittal way.
For example, a cognitivist might say that the predicate ‘is wrong’ in the sentence 
“Sexual assault is wrong” represents the property of being wrong, and this is why this 
sentence is true iff sexual assault has the property of being wrong. (Most who endorse 
cognitivism think that this or some other simple sentence deploying ‘is wrong’ is literally 
true, and so they embrace a form of metaethical realism; however, one can obviously be 
a cognitivist and antirealist in metaethics by developing a form of error theory or fiction-
alism.) A noncognitivist would typically reject this, arguing that ‘is wrong’ is not a term 
primarily for representing a property but rather a term primarily for expressing one’s 
negative evaluation of something. Hence, noncognitivists often deny that ethical sen-
tences such as “Sexual assault is wrong” are the sorts of sentences properly said to be true 
or false; or they argue that these sentences have truth conditions in a “deflationary sense” 
incompatible with a substantive appeal to truth in one’s explanation of their meaning. 
In any case, they think the real action for explaining the meaning of ethical terms lies in 
the way they serve as vehicles for the expression of emotive or evaluative states of mind 
rather than the way they represent reality.
If we understand the main debate in metaethics about meaning like this, it’s unclear 
where a view focusing on conceptual roles rather than representational purport or 
 emotive/evaluative expressive function would fit in. With a little care, however, I think 
we can find versions of the conceptual role view in theories defended by some philoso-
phers inspired by cognitivism and also by other philosophers inspired by noncognitiv-
ism. Moreover, I think there’s also a third way to conceive of a conceptual role view, one 
which undermines the stark distinction between cognitivism and noncognitivism (at 
least as it’s commonly understood).1
Because of this, in what follows, I want to explain three ways to develop a conceptual 
role view of meaning in metaethics. First, I’ll suggest that there’s a way to combine inspi-
ration from noncognitivism with a particular form of the conceptual role view to form a 
noncognitivist view with distinctive advantages over other noncognitivist views. Second, 
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I’ll suggest that there’s also a way to combine a strong commitment to cognitivism with a 
different form of the conceptual role view to form a version of cognitivism with distinc-
tive advantages over other cognitivist views. Finally, I argue that another way to think of 
the conceptual role view in metaethics is as opening up the space for a third way, beyond 
cognitivism and noncognitivism. But before I turn to those arguments, I begin with 
brief comments on some relevant distinctions about what determines conceptual roles 
and what kind of internal connection between ethical thought and action there may be. 
Then I use these distinctions to explain the three different applications of the conceptual 
role view.
Some dIStInctIonS
There isn’t such a thing as the “conceptual role view about meaning.” Rather there is a 
family of loosely connected views stressing the conceptual role of terms in determining 
their meaning (usually in contrast to the referential purport of those terms, though we’ll 
see below that those aren’t in strict tension). We can begin to understand the contours of 
this family of views by marking some choice points that distinguish different versions.
Here, without claims to being exhaustive, are four choices any complete conceptual 
role account of meaning must make (compare Whiting [2006]):
1. Functionalism vs. Normativism: What determines a “conceptual role”? Is it the con-
nections between terms/concepts that a normal user is disposed to make in various 
circumstances or the ones a normal user ought to make?
2. Globalism vs. Localism about representational content: Do conceptual roles gener-
ally determine representational content or is some significant class of conceptual 
roles nonrepresentational?
3. Solipsistic vs. Social: Is the primary locus of a conceptual role in individuals or lin-
guistic communities?
4. Wide vs. Narrow: Are “language-entry” (from world to mind) and “language-exit” 
(from mind to world) connections included in a conceptual role? Relatedly, how 
many conceptual connections are meaning-determining for a term—some “core” 
set, or all2 of them?
In what follows, I focus on 1–2 because (somewhat surprisingly) 3–4 don’t seem to mat-
ter much to distinguishing the three main ways that I think conceptual roles views might 
be developed in metaethics. Any complete conceptual role view, though, must settle on 
answers to all of these questions.
Something else that will be relevant in what follows is what kinds of “internal” con-
nections there may be between ethical thought and action. This is because it is often seen 
as a benefit of conceptual role views that they can incorporate the supposedly internal 
connection between ethical thoughts and the actions based on them into an account of 
the conceptual role of ethical terms. If this works, then it might provide the best explana-
tion of some of the distinctive features of ethical terms in their connections to actions.
As is well known, many different ideas go under the label “internalism” in metaethics, 
and in philosophy more generally. It would take a whole essay to develop even a highly 
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contentious map of the different versions of internalism. In lieu of this, I propose to work 
with the following crude distinction between:
1. Causal Internalism (vague), the thesis that one’s thought that one ought to ϕ in C 
tends in some special way to dispose one’s ceteris paribus to ϕ whenever in C; and
2. Normative Internalism (vague), the thesis that one’s thought that one ought to ϕ in C 
commits one in some special way to ϕ whenever in C.
With those distinctions in hand, let’s turn to some possible applications of the conceptual 
role view in metaethics.
the conceptual role VIew deVeloped aS a Form oF noncognItIVISm
The first kind of view is inspired by noncognitivism, which I’m treating here as the view 
that ethical words contribute emotive or evaluative content rather than representational 
content to the sentences in which they figure. By drawing on the resources of conceptual 
role accounts of meaning, there may be room to improve on both traditional and other 
contemporary views in this vein.
The first step is to argue that the role of a concept is determined by the function it has 
in our mental economies, its application being caused by and then causing various other 
applications of concepts. Then, if we assume that words get their meaning from the con-
cepts they express, we get a Functionalist version of the conceptual role view of meaning. 
(Compare Block [1986], Field [1977], and Harman [1999].)
Next, one mobilizes the metaphor of “directions of fit,” whereby some mental states are 
conceived of as representational in that they “aim” to fit the world and other mental states 
are conceived of as directive in that they “aim” to get the world to fit them. Then, given 
a broadly Humean conception of our mental economies, which has it that the coopera-
tion of both kinds of mental states is crucial for motivation to action as well as coordi-
nating our preferences, one can argue that the conceptual role of ethical predicates is 
action-guiding and preference-coordinating rather than reality-representing. (Compare 
Bennett [1976].) The argument is roughly that this provides the best explanation of what-
ever truth there is in the Causal Internalist idea that ethical thoughts have a special causal 
effect with respect to motivating action and preference.
What results is a picture, according to which some predicates are reality-representing. 
For instance, ordinary empirical predicates will have, on this view, the conceptual (in 
this case, functional) role of keeping track of the properties of things in our mostly non-
linguistic external environment. However, ethical predicates are different because of the 
way their conceptual roles are functionally connected to causing action. In terms of the 
second choice point above, this means the view is Localist about representational con-
tent: The conceptual role of some predicates determines representational content, but 
this is not true of all predicates, since other predicates (especially ones expressing ethical 
concepts) don’t have representational content on this view.
I’m not sure if anyone endorses a functionalist localist version of the conceptual role 
view so baldly as I have just presented it, but Blackburn (2006) speaks very favorably 
about it.3 He contrasts his preferred “non-factualism” about particular areas of thought 
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and speech with an approach to semantics that “works in terms of what words and 
 sentences represent.” And he suggests that one positive reason in favor of adopting non-
factualism about ethical thought and speech concerns “functional role”:
The mental states we voice as we communicate values or moralize to each other 
seem to be attitudes or practical stances that orientate us towards the world rather 
than representing any part of it. In a familiar metaphor, they have a different ‘direc-
tion of fit’ with the world, behaving more like desires, whose function is to effect 
changes in the world rather than beliefs, whose function is to represent the world. 
(2006: 245)
And he describes a change in his own view about how best to respond to the Frege-Geach 
challenge as one moving toward a conceptual role semantics. He describes himself as 
having proposed, in Blackburn 1988, to modify his theory of the meaning of conditionals 
by “drawing on conceptual role semantics Harman 1973” and arguing that conditionals 
get their meaning simply by their role in forcing moves from their antecedents to their 
consequents, or from the negation of their consequents to the negation of their anteced-
ents (Blackburn 2006: 247).
I take the idea here to be that, rather than suggesting, as some noncognitivists have, 
that the meaning of a term is the attitude/concept it expresses, we say that the meaning 
is the conceptual role of whatever attitude/concept is expressed by the term. Then, by 
allowing for directive rather than representational conceptual roles, we get the view that 
some terms aren’t representations of reality; and by allowing for distinctive pressures on 
action (e.g., via desire-like directions of fit) we get the positive alternative: Ethical terms 
are action-guiding rather than world-representing.
In the paper discussing conceptual roles, Blackburn doesn’t work through a concrete 
example, but a quick sketch of one might aid comprehension. I take it his idea is that a predi-
cate such as ‘is wrong’ means what it does because the concept of something being wrong is 
connected functionally to other concepts in a complex web of interconnected concepts. It’s 
nontrivial to map this web precisely, but it will include tendencies to make transitions like
 · belief that something causes unnecessary pain and suffering → belief that it is wrong
 · belief that something is right → belief that it is not wrong
 · belief that something is wrong → intention not to do it
 · belief that something is wrong → preference that others not do it
Is this a version of noncognitivism? Well, as long as these conceptual connections are 
funded by the role ‘is wrong’ has in evaluating things rather than what it picks out in 
reality, it’ll be a view that denies that ‘is wrong‘ is a term primarily for representing a 
property. The idea instead is to view it as a term primarily for expressing one’s negative 
evaluation of something. (Of course, we shouldn’t forget that Blackburn [1993; 1998] also 
pioneered the quasi-realist development of this idea, which hopes to recover talk of moral 
properties and moral truths via minimalist treatments of ‘property’ and ‘truth’.) In any 
case, developing the idea in conceptual-role terms promises to carry an advantage over 
other noncognitivist-inspired views in metaethics: Unlike emotivist views, Blackburn can 
argue that the inferential connections revealed by Frege-Geach style objections are simply 
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special cases of the conceptual (i.e., functional) connections ethical words bear to other 
words. (Compare Båve [2013] and Warren [2015].) Moreover—and this is rather specula-
tive—unlike prescriptivists like Hare and perhaps even fellow expressivists like Gibbard, 
Blackburn’s variegated functionalism is more flexible in that the functional role of ethical 
concepts doesn’t always have to be spelled out in terms of prescriptions or plans. So it 
looks like it’s going to be able to handle cases where it is implausible that ethical claims are 
“universally prescriptive” or “plan-laden” in any plausible sense of these notions.
As I see things, to make this fly, Blackburn needs something plausible to say about how 
the conceptual roles (as he conceives them) of ethical terms determine their contribution 
to the truth-conditions of the sentences in which they figure. Of course, as a quasi-realist, 
he’ll want some kind of deflationism about truth, so that assigning truth conditions to a 
sentence in the way we do in compositional semantics is not viewed as ascribing it repre-
sentational content. But even so, if our functionalism is too loose, allowing in all sorts of 
dispositional connections between various attitudes, we risk conceptual roles including 
extraneous stuff not plausibly thought to be determinative of the sort of semantic content 
that is supposed to determine truth conditions. So we’ll want some plausible story about 
a term’s “core” functional role, which allows us to distinguish in a non-question-begging 
way which functional connections are part of the meaning of ethical terms and which are 
extrasemantic (e.g., because of deriving from pragmatic goals or from customs of polite-
ness, etc.). Also, a view like this one will face the sorts of challenges that have been posed 
by Kripke (1982) to the idea that naturalistically describable functional roles might deter-
mine semantic content. (For ideas on how to preserve noncognitivism within a broadly 
normative conception of meaning, which might provide a way to respond to this objec-
tion, see Price [2011] and Gibbard [2012].)
the conceptual role VIew deVeloped aS a Form oF cognItIVISm
A flatfooted representationalist account of meaning might say that predicates mean what 
they mean solely in virtue of what properties, in reality, they stand for. We know this can’t 
be right because two different terms can stand for the same property in reality, even nec-
essarily so, without being synonymous—‘closed triangular figure’ and ‘closed trilateral 
figure’ have different meanings (witness the fact that someone might understand one but 
not the other). As a result, many have been tempted to say that the meaning of terms is 
determined by something like their conventionalized role in our conceptually imbued 
practices. On this view, grasping a term’s meaning amounts to something like cottoning 
onto enough of the core rules governing its use. This is one thing that might be called a 
term’s “conceptual role.”
Peacocke (1995) argued, however, that going this route is compatible with the view that 
concepts stand for things in reality or that the terms expressing concepts have referen-
tial purport as part of their meaning. For one might think that part of the job of terms 
is to express concepts, and part of the role of these concepts is to stand for something in 
reality (whether instantiated or not). If that’s right, then although we might focus in the 
first instance on explaining the way one ought to use a term, this explanation could be 
argued to determine what in reality this term stands for. For example, a kind of conceptual 
role view about ‘is red’ might say that this means what it means because of its  conceptual 
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 connection to other predicates such as ‘is colored’ and ‘is crimson’, but that this  conceptual 
role  determines what in reality the term stands for: the property of redness.
Moreover, once we had that in the picture, we could mobilize relatively standard 
accounts of how different terms standing for different things can, along with logical form, 
determine the conditions under which declarative sentences with those terms are true. 
Accordingly, it seems that embracing a conceptual role account of meaning is perfectly 
consistent with a representationalist understanding of truth-conditional semantics.
Whether that is the best understanding of truth-conditional semantics is, of course, a 
controversial issue. But I bring this possibility up here in order to explain how this line of 
thought opens up space for an account of the meaning of ethical terms inspired by tradi-
tional realist forms of cognitivism but also with improved resources for addressing one of 
the standard worries about those views.
The worry is that construing an ethical predicate such as ‘is wrong’ as standing for 
some property (such as being wrong) makes it hard to account for an apparent differ-
ence between the practical justificatory force of ethical claims and other claims. Roughly 
put, this difference is that ethical terms are mainly for evaluating things in a way that we 
take to bear pretty directly on which actions to perform, whereas other words seem to be 
mainly for describing things in a way that seems to bear only indirectly on which actions 
to perform. How could the term ‘is wrong’, when it’s presumed to stand for being wrong, 
carry this extra justificatory “oomph,” compared with a non-ethical term such as ‘is fre-
quent’, which is presumed to stand for being frequent? For, if someone thinks an action 
is frequent, nothing follows about what they’re justified in doing, whereas someone who 
thinks that an action is wrong is prima facie justified in not performing it. (As we’ll see, 
this is clearly related to the Normative Internalist thesis mentioned above.)
Something like this line of thought forces some cognitivists to say that ethical proper-
ties are sui generis precisely in the sense that their attribution carries special practical 
justificatory force. However, a Peacocke-inspired conceptual role account of the meaning 
of ethical terms would have a different response: The practical justificatory force of the 
attribution of ethical properties could be part of their conceptual role, in the sense that 
it’s one of the rules of use one must grasp (at least implicitly) in order to count as under-
standing their meaning; it doesn’t have to be a sui generis feature of the things in reality 
that they refer to. In terms of the distinction gestured at above, this amounts to an argu-
ment that a conceptual role view of meaning might, when applied to ethical terms, offer 
a better explanation of whatever truth there is in Normative Internalism than competing 
cognitivist views.
It’s possible to develop this idea in a functionalist way by arguing that ethical thoughts 
tend to cause other thoughts about actions being justified or thoughts about practical 
commitments. However, I think a normativist development better captures the norma-
tive version of internalism, which isn’t about what thoughts someone tends to have but 
rather what actions one is committed to in virtue of having ethical thoughts. The idea is 
that part of the conceptual role of ethical terms is their power to commit one who deploys 
them to act in various ways. Whether one tends to be motivated to so act is a separate 
question.
Should the view be Globalist or Localist? There’s room to go either way on this choice 
point, though there’s pressure to develop the view in Globalist ways: Insofar as the view 
is inspired by a version of cognitivism, a normativist conceptual role account of the 
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 meaning of ethical terms will need some justification for saying that ethical predicates 
have (or determine) representational content. One good justification would be that all 
predicates are assumed to represent properties. This is the globalist position. (It would 
be open, however, to someone developing this cognitivist view of ethical terms to argue 
that ethical terms are representational but some other terms are not. For example, there 
is more purely, narrowly linguistic evidence that epistemic modals and probability opera-
tors behave nonrepresentationally. (Compare Yalcin [2007; 2011].) So, one could be anti-
representationalist about them but not about ethical terms.
Again, I don’t know if anyone develops a Normativist, Globalist application of the 
conceptual role view to ethical terms as baldly as I just have here, but Wedgwood (2001; 
2007) has developed a metaethical view in this general vein. He argues that an account 
of the meaning of any term and so ipso facto ethical terms should explain “what it is for 
someone to understand the term—that is, to be a competent user of the term” (2001: 5). 
Drawing on Peacocke (1987; 1995), then, he develops this idea of competence in terms 
of dispositions to follow the basic rules of rationality governing a term’s use: “According 
to the version of conceptual role semantics that I wish to develop, the meaning of a 
term is given by the basic rules of rationality governing its use” (Wedgwood 2001: 6). 
What makes them “basic” for him is that “the rationality of following these rules, and 
the irrationality of violating them, must not be due merely to the availability of some 
independent justification of these rules” (Wedgwood 2001: 8), presumably ruling out 
non-semantic justifications of pragmatics, politeness, etc. These comments suggest a nor-
mativist understanding of the conceptual role—indeed, one with resources for distin-
guishing between all of the various connections that may stand between concepts and the 
“core” ones determinative of meaning.
As Wedgwood notes, the conceptual role of any term will be complex in ways that are 
difficult to map succinctly, and even his summary treatment of ‘better’ and ‘ought’ have 
complexities I won’t cover here. But it may aid comprehension to sketch the basic idea 
with these two terms. Wedgwood (2001) argues that thinking that some course of action 
is, all things considered, better than another commits one to having a preference for that 
course of action over the other. So, he thinks a core rule of rationality governing “better” 
is that one make transitions in thought of the form:
belief that x is all things considered better than y for me to do → preference for 
doing x over doing y.
Similarly, Wedgwood (2007: chapter 4) argues that thinking that p ought to be true (in 
the way characteristic of all things considered deliberative normative thought for one-
self) commits one to making the truth of p part of one’s ideal plan about what to do. So, 
that means that he thinks a core rule of rationality governing ‘ought’ is that one make 
transitions in thought of the form:
belief that p ought (all things considered, and relevantly to my practical delibera-
tion) to be true → planning for p to be true.
So far, that sounds like something that could be incorporated into a noncognitivist version 
of the conceptual role view if we traded out Blackburn’s functionalism for a  normativist 
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conception of these transitions. However, Wedgwood clearly intends his view as a version 
of cognitivism.
In the earlier paper, he proposes to simply “…assume that every moral term has the 
function of standing for a property or relation,” which amounts to assuming “…that 
cognitivism is correct, and that the meaning of moral terms is straight-forwardly truth- 
conditional” (2007: 6). In the book (Wedgwood 2007), he spends a chapter arguing against 
noncognitivist views, including sophisticated expressivist views such as Blackburn (1998) 
and Gibbard (2003). I don’t have space here to present his argument in full, but it turns 
on the idea that there are preferences and plans that are correct in some more “external” 
sense than being determined by coherence with all of one’s other beliefs, preferences, and 
plans (even when these are improved by further information and more careful reflection). 
Because of this, he thinks our normative thought and discourse is implicitly committed 
(in ways an expressivist cannot capture) to there being some property or relation that 
betterness- and ought-judgments are about. This will be the property or relation mak-
ing the core set rules governing the use of these terms valid and complete. Insisting that 
the conceptual roles of predicate terms determine such properties or relations is what he 
takes to secure his commitment to cognitivism. Moreover, he argues that the availability 
of this package undermines any advantage noncognitivists might have thought they win 
from the internal justificatory connection between ethical concepts and action. He writes 
“…the idea that the meaning of moral terms is given by their role in practical reasoning 
is fully available to cognitivists, and so lends no support to noncognitivism” (Wedgwood 
2001: 18).
Once we’re working with a cognitivist conception of conceptual roles, however, 
there’s also a more general reason to think ethical terms add representational content 
to the sentences in which they figure: If you thought that a term expresses a concept iff 
it affects the truth conditions of sentences in which it figures, and you had a represen-
tationalist conception of truth-conditions, then you might think that all semantically 
contributing terms should be treated representationally. In other words, in order to have 
a semantic value, a term would have to stand for something (though what it stands for 
is determined by its conceptual role). This reasoning seems to be in the background of 
what Wedgwood says regarding the semantics of ‘ought’: “Within the semantic frame-
work that I am assuming here, the semantic value of the concept ‘O<A, t>’ will in effect 
be a certain property of propositions—presumably, a relational property that proposi-
tions have in virtue of some relation in which they stand to the agent A at the time t” 
(2007: 99).
Because he thinks some ethical statements are true and so successfully represent 
reality, Wedgwood’s view faces the metaphysical challenges of other realist views: Show 
that the properties represented by ethical words are natural or explain why it’s ok in this 
case (but not in most other cases) to countenance the existence of non-natural proper-
ties. Also, the conceptual role he gives for ‘ought’ treats it as a propositional operator, 
roughly akin to a necessity operator. Hence, his globalism leads him to view this as 
representing a property had by propositions. This commits the moral realist going this 
route not only to properties of goodness and wrongness but also to properties propo-
sitions have when they are correctly incorporated into plans. One might reasonably 
be more skeptical of such “logical” properties of propositions than of more ordinary 
 properties of actions.
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the conceptual role VIew aS a thIrd optIon
The labels “cognitivism” and “noncognitivism” suggest there is no third way, but the 
 substance of the views (at least as defined above, which I think captures one prominent 
way these labels are used in metaethics) doesn’t rule out a view according to which ethi-
cal words contribute neither representational content nor emotive/evaluative content 
to the sentences in which they figure. To see this, notice that a common view taken 
about terms such as the copula (‘is’), articles (‘a’, ‘the’), logical connectives (‘not’, ‘if ’), 
and epistemic operators (‘probably’) is that they don’t stand for things in reality, but 
neither do they carry emotive/evaluative content. Rather, they do various other jobs in 
our sentences, such as linking together other words with representational and/or evalua-
tive content and qualifying, situating, or displacing some embedded piece of representa-
tional content. The third conceptual role view I discuss here takes inspiration from this 
model to suggest that the conceptual role of at least some ethical terms is to perform one 
of these other jobs.
It’s not clear how to think of these “other jobs” in general, but one significant distinc-
tion is between broadly “logical” and “non-logical” terms. In this vein, with a very broad 
conception of the “logical,” Brandom (2008) argues that we should recognize a distinc-
tion between terms directly involved in first-order conceptualization of reality and what 
to do in it (roughly, what we convey with simple declarative and volitive/imperative sen-
tences) and terms whose job it is to “make explicit” the inferential commitments implic-
itly carried by first-order thought and discourse. (Compare also Kant [1997: 209], Frege 
[1879: 13], and Sellars [1958].) On Brandom’s way of working out this view, terms in this 
latter class have a distinctively second-order conceptual role in their job of articulating 
inference rules. These are not descriptions of how people happen to infer but norma-
tive claims about how people ought to infer. As such, this suggests a Normativist ver-
sion of the conceptual role view (with Wedgwood, against Blackburn). However (against 
Wedgwood, with Blackburn), it is Localist about representational content: Not all words’ 
conceptual roles determine representational contents. Some words are treated as “meta-
conceptual” devices for talking about the inferential connections between other words.
This is most plausible when applied to ethical words that are also operator-like. In 
Chrisman (2016), I focus on ‘ought’, which is plausibly construed as functioning seman-
tically as an intensional (and more specifically, modal) operator. (Compare Castañeda’s 
[1975] treatment of ‘ought’ as a practical necessity operator and Sellars’ [1958: 282; 1968: 
chapter 7] suggestion that its content is partly determined by its distinguished role in 
practical reasoning.) According to the argument I develop, the conceptual role of this 
word is like other intensional operators, such as ‘might’ or ‘probably’, in that its addi-
tion to a sentence shifts something about how the sentence puts forward some embed-
ded piece of content. For example, “Paula might be home,” is not treated as representing 
Paula (or anyone else, such as her counterparts in some epistemically accessible possible 
worlds) as having some property but rather is conceived as a vehicle for putting forward 
a more basic piece of representational content (Paula is at home) as an epistemically open 
possibility, roughly something not ruled out by the beliefs held to be commonly agreed 
upon in an ongoing conversation.
Similarly, then, we might think that “Paula ought to be home” does not represent Paula 
(or anyone else, such as her counterparts in all normatively accessible worlds) as having 
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some property, but rather conceive of this sentence as a vehicle for putting forward a more 
basic piece of content (Paula is at home) as a normative necessity, roughly  something that 
is, so to speak, ruled in by the beliefs and norms/prescriptions held to be commonly 
agreed upon in an ongoing conversation.
In this way, we get a version of the conceptual role view that treats the conceptual role of 
some terms as distinctive from representational terms, not in their link to emotive/evalua-
tive content but rather in their metaconceptual function. Because, on this view, the words 
with metaconceptual function do not add representational content to the sentences in 
which they figure, this view might be classed as a form of antirealism about ‘ought’, avoiding 
many ontological worries associated with realist forms of cognitivism. However, because 
this metaconceptual function is very specific, the hope is that the view will have an easier 
time than the noncognitivist-inspired conceptual role view discussed above at explaining 
how these words affect the truth-conditional content of the sentences in which they figure. 
Moreover, there should be less of a worry about how to cordon off apparently nonsemantic 
connections between the concepts expressed by these terms and other concepts.
In chapter 5 of Chrisman (2016), I argue that a modification of the standard truth-
conditional semantics for modal operators can be developed to predict contents for many 
of the diverse flavors of ought-sentences we witness in natural language. This semantic 
account is incomplete, but insofar as it makes plausible predictions in a compositionally 
tractable way, I think that represents an advance over expressivist views that would assign 
contents to ought-sentences in some nonstandard way. In my view, developing a plau-
sible rule for predicting truth conditions for arbitrary ought-sentences leaves open the 
crucial metasemantic issue of what it is in virtue of which these sentences have the truth 
conditions that they do. I then argue in chapter 6 that a broadly inferentialist account of 
meaning has resources to explain the conceptual role of ‘ought’ in a way that grounds 
its semantic content in neither a word-world representation relation nor a word-mind 
expression relation. This form of antirealism assimilates ‘ought’ more with an antirealist 
view of the meaning of necessity modals than with an antirealist view of the meaning of 
emotive/evaluative terms.
Where does a view like this stand with respect to both Causal and Normative 
Internalisms? Regarding the former, there is nothing to prevent someone pursuing this 
kind of view of the meaning of a term such as ‘ought’ to argue that there is a causal–func-
tional connection between applications of this words and motivations to act. For my part, 
I think such a connection is plausible only in a very small percentage of the cases where 
we use ‘ought’ (roughly, whenever it’s plausibly interpreted as all-things-considered and 
about the speaker’s own future actions), so I think it’s implausible to think this is a “core” 
element of the term’s meaning, but there’s nothing in the basic contours of the view that 
rules out develop a specific version of it with this feature. Much more plausible, I think, 
is some form of the normative internalist thesis. And the normativist development of a 
conceptual role view of ‘ought’ provides ample resources to capture whatever truth there 
is in that thesis.
In the context of metaethics, there are two important challenges faced by views like 
this one. First, it is not clear that they can be extended to cover ethical (or normative) 
terms considered quite generally. The word ‘ought’ might be one of the core normative 
terms, but semantically it is an intensional operator, and that’s what supports the idea 
that its conceptual role is metaconceptual. The term ‘is wrong’, however, is an ordinary 
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 predicate. Sure, we sometimes think that what makes such words ethical (or normative) 
is that they bear directly on what one ought to do, but significant work still needs to 
be done to show that the Brandom-inspired conceptual-role view about ‘ought’ can be 
developed into a full metaethical view about the meaning of ethical words (see Chrisman 
[2016: chapter 7] where this is discussed in more detail). Second, it is not clear what it is 
in virtue of which the word ‘ought’ (and other so-called “metaconceptual” words) has the 
second-order conceptual role that I’ve suggested that it has. In contrast to Blackburn, a 
defender of this view cannot locate this in natural facts about how we happen to use these 
words, as this version of the conceptual role view is normativist rather than functional-
ist; and in contrast to Wedgwood, a defender of this view cannot locate this in the bits 
of reality that these words stand for, as its localism is designed to avoid commitment to 
thinking these words stand for things in reality. So, what kind of fact is it that ‘ought’ has 
a second-order or “metaconceptual” conceptual role? A full defense of this view requires 
a convincing answer to this difficult question. It’s one that arises when we think meaning 
is, in some important sense, normative, but are inclined to think “the normative” is not 
some special realm of reality. What happens when we turn a normativist conceptual role 
version of antirealism about normative terms on itself?
concluSIon
At the beginning of this essay, I said that it’s unclear where conceptual role views about 
meaning apply amongst metaethical theories about the meaning of ethical terms. I think 
that’s because the basic idea behind conceptual role views can be developed in several 
interesting ways. In some of Blackburn’s work, we see a noncogntivist-inspired form of 
the view. It’s a Functionalist and Localist version of the conceptual role view, explain-
ing the meaning of ethical words in terms of the way the concepts they express serve to 
direct action and, as such, do not have representational content. By contrast, Wedgwood 
develops a cognitivist-inspired application of the conceptual role view to ethical terms. 
It appears to be a Normativist and Globalist version of the view, explaining the mean-
ing of ethical words in terms of the core set of rules governing the practical reasoning 
of one deploying the concepts that they express, which he takes to determine the prop-
erty that they denote. In my work, I’ve been inspired by Wedgwood’s Normativism and 
Blackburn’s Localism. By drawing on Brandom’s idea to distinguish terms with a second-
order metaconceptual role from terms with first-order descriptive function in our con-
ceptually imbued practices, I think we might develop an explanation of the meaning of 
at least some core ethical terms that is not obviously cognitivist nor noncognitivist (but 
antirealist in a more pragmatist sort of way).
Above, I mentioned two further questions any conceptual role account of meaning 
must answer: Is the primary locus of conceptual role in individuals or linguistic commu-
nities? And, are “language-entry” (from world to mind) and “language-exit” (from mind 
to world) connections included in the conceptual role? I think all of the views I have 
discussed here are compatible with either answer to both questions.
In the first case, this is because, for all we have said about what conceptual roles might 
be like, we have said very little about what grounds them or where they come from. 
Many in the conceptual role tradition stress the way language is a social phenomenon, 
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which inclines those who view conceptual roles as a key to explaining linguistic mean-
ing to favor a more social answer to the first question. However, one could also think 
that the psychology of individual agents and its biological development takes pride of 
place in the explanation of the possibility of content; and if one does, it can begin to 
seem like the sociality of linguistic practice depends on the prior existence of a more 
solipsistic kind of content. The important point here is that it is a general issue for any 
conceptual role view and not something that seems to bear specifically on conceptual 
role views in metaethics.
The second question might seem to have more bearing on metaethics, because many 
in the conceptual role tradition have thought that the conceptual role of ethical terms 
must have something to do with action, which is the paradigmatic “language-exit,” where 
our minds, so to speak, touch the world. However, for any “wide” conceptual role view 
(including language-exit connections as part of conceptual roles), it seems to me that we 
could imagine an analogous “narrow” conceptual role view that stops the connection at 
the point of an intention or volition. So, again, this seems to be an issue that cuts across 
various developments of the conceptual role view in metaethics. 
noteS
 1. Of course, one could simply define noncognitivism as the denial of cognitivism, in which case conceptual 
role views would have to fall on one side or the other. However, that way of conceiving of noncognitivism 
doesn’t fit well with antirepresentationalist views witnessed in areas other than ethics. Some philosophers 
think, for example, that epistemic modals, probability operators, the truth predicate, etc. are not devices 
of representation. However, it’s weird to refer to them as noncognitivists about these things, as they 
would insist that thought involving the relevant concepts is part of cognition rather than affect, and they 
generally think it can constitute knowledge.
 2. This is related to a broader issue in the philosophy of language about holism vs. atomism about mean-
ings. Predictably, no one in favor of a conceptual-role view is an atomist, in the sense of holding that a 
word/concept has content all on its own, as something that then gets added atomistically to form the 
compound contents of phrases and sentences. However, there are differing opinions about whether it is 
possible to draw some non-arbitrary line between the connections language users tend or ought to track 
that are part of specifically semantic competence with words and those that are part of wider understand-
ing of the world. If, following Quine, one thinks there is no sharp line between analytic and synthetic 
truths, then one will think it difficult to draw a sharp line between the “conceptual connections” and the 
“substantive” connections between various propositions. However, most conceptual role theorists will be 
happy to recognize that some connections are more central to a term’s meaning than others.
 3. See also Köhler (2014, forthcoming) for someone who endorses a view like this one. Gibbard (2003) 
develops a sophisticated and noncognitivism-friendly account of the contents of the mental states 
expressed by normative sentences. He suggests that this account, which construes all normative thought 
as “plan-laden,” is consistent with a naturalistic account of the role normative thoughts play in our men-
tal economies (especially in their connection to action). (See especially pp. 154 and 195.) If we take these 
plan-laden thoughts (and the sentences expressing them) to have those contents in virtue of playing the 
relevant role in guiding action, then I think we get another version of the functionalist kind of conceptual 
role view sketched above. It’s somewhat more restrictive about the role played by normative thought than 
I think Blackburn wants to be, but it still would explain meaning in terms of functional role. However, 
Gibbard also suggests there that his view of the contents of the mental states expressed by normative sen-
tences is consistent with the view that meaning is normative, which in his scheme would mean that the 
thoughts expressed by normative sentences cannot be identified in purely naturalistic terms. (This idea is 
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explored in much more detail in Gibbard [2012].) Going this way would constitute a departure from the 
functionalist kind of conceptual role view sketched above.
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